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Theory and Practice: The Point of Contact 
Roderick M. Chisholm 
1. Endeavour 
What follows is a highly theoretical discussion of the point 
of contact between theory and practice. My hope is to de-
scribe these things clearly and precisely and with the use 
of as few undefined terms as possible. 
Theory and practice come together when a person's 
intentional attitudes determine the way he acts upon the 
world. Our 'theory' is constituted by the beliefs that we 
have, and our 'practice' by our endeavours. Endeavour, 
like believing and judging, is an intentional act or atti-
tude, and it exhibits all those features commonly associ-
ated with intentionality. 
An example of endeavour is expressed by the follow-
ing locution: 
S endeavours to bring it about that so-and-so. 
An alternative is: 
S endeavours to be such that so-and-so. 
The phrase replacing 'so-and-so' may be said to describe 
the content of the endeavour. This content may be ex-
pressed in such well-formed sentences as 'there is peace 
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in the world' and •the concert begins'. It may also be 
expressed in a sentence containing a pronoun that refers 
back to the original subject S, as in •s endeavours to 
bring it about that he is understood by his audience.' 
There are two ways of looking upon the content of 
endeavour - what is expressed by •so-and-so' in the 
above locutions. These reflect different conceptions of 
intentionality. 
(I) One may say that the content of endeavour is a 
proposition which the subject S endeavours to make true. 
Those who speak this way would say that, if I am trying 
to find the person who stole my automobile, then the con-
tent of my endeavour is the proposition I would express 
by saying 'I find the person who stole my automobile'. 
This way of looking at endeavour therefore presupposes 
that there are propositions expressed by first-person 
sentences. 
(2) According to the alternative conception of the 
content of endeavour, the content is, not a proposition 
that one endeavours to make true, but a property that 
one endeavours to have. Our example would now be put 
by saying that I endeavour to have the property of being 
a person who finds the one who stole his automobile. (Of 
course, the thief, if there is one, may also be such that I 
am endeavouring to bring it about that he has a certain 
property - say, that of being caught. But, according to 
this second way of viewing intentionality, my relationship 
to the thief may be put somewhat as follows: •There is 
just one person who stole my automobile and I am endeav-
ouring to have the property of being a person such that 
the one who stole his automobile is caught:) We need not 
decide which of these two conceptions of intentionality is 
correct, but I will assume that one of them is correct. 
There are other, more impressive ways of characterising 
the content of an intentional attitude, but, so far as I 
have been able to see, they do not in fact add anything 
to the two accounts just described. 
If I am looking for the one who stole my automobile 
and if you are the one who stole it, then you might be 
54 
Theory and Practice: The Point of Contact 
said to be the transcendent object of my endeavour. At 
any rate, this is the kind of terminology that has been 
used by some of the members of the Brentano school. If 
we talk this way, we must note that the transcendent ob-
ject is different from the content of the endeavour and 
that my relation to the transcendent object is different 
from my relation to the content. But my relation to the 
object is, in a certain sense, determined by the nature of 
the content. This determination is quite straightforward 
and should be apparent from our example. The example 
tells us that, for a certain property that only one thing 
can have at a time and for a certain relation, I am en-
deavouring to get into that relation with the thing that 
has that property. The property is that of being the sole 
person who stole my automobile and the relation is that 
of finding. So if you are the person who has this prop-
erty, then you are the transcendent object of my endeav-
our. 
2. Judging 
To understand the intentionality of endea~our we should 
compare it with that of judging, or believing. We may 
single out the content of judging as we have done in the 
case of endeavour, and we may note that some acts of 
judgment have transcendent objects and others not. If we 
say that the endeavour is 'directed upon' its transcendent 
object, then we should not say that it is, in the same 
sense, •directed upon' its content. There are two ways of 
looking at the content of judging: either it is a proposi-
tion that one accepts; or it is a property that one attrib-
utes to oneself. 
If I believe you to be a thief, then you are the tran-
scendent object of my belief and the content of my belief 
will be partially fulfilled by you. If believing is a matter 
of accepting a proposition, then the proposition that I 
accept will imply, with respect to some property that only 
you have, that the thing that has that property is a thief. 
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Or if believing is a matter of directly attributing proper-
ties to oneself, then the property I attribute to myself 
will imply, with respect to a relation that only you bear 
to me, that the thing that bears that relation to me is a 
thief (that is to say, the property is necessarily such that 
a thief bears that relation to whatever has the property). 
3. The Object of Endeavour 
Suppose that I try to stir up difficulties between you and 
your neighbour. We may, but need not, say that in such a 
case my endeavour has two transcendent objects. We could 
say that that aggregate, sum or col/ectivum, which is you 
and your neighbour, is the transcendent object of my en-
deavour. 
An endeavour need not have a transcendent object. It 
could be that no one stole my automobile; possibly I never 
~ad one. In such a case, shall we say, all the same, that 
it has an intentionally inexistent •immanent object'? The 
introduction of this concept serves no purpose whatever 
and only makes philosophical trouble. I think, therefore, 
we can afford to dispense with it. We could also, of 
course, dispense with the concept of a transcendent object 
and this might prevent us from making certain errors. But 
I have spoken of a transcendent object in order to bring 
out the fact that endeavour may be directed upon an ex-
istent thing - it may be de re. (If you are the thief and 
if I am looking for the thief, then there exists a certain 
x which is such that I am endeavouring to find x.) 
An endeavour may also be said, in a certain sense, to 
have too many transcendent objects. Suppose I mistakenly 
believe that the person who stole my automobile is the 
person I met on the street last night. If one person is the 
one who stole my automobile and another person is the 
one I met on the street, then, if I successfully lay a trap 
for my transcendent object, I may get more than I had 
bargained for. I may catch two persons instead of one. 
There is also the case where the endeavour has a tran-
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possibility brings us, finally, to the problem of the con-
tact between theory and practice. 
4. The Problem of Contact 
A person's theory makes practical contact with an object 
if the person makes an immediate attempt upon that ob-
ject. What, then, is an immediate attempt upon an object'! 
Perhaps one will say that, if you are the transcendent 
object of my endeavour and if my endeavour has certain 
ef /ects upon you, then I have made an attempt upon you. 
But this is too simple. I may sound an alarm in the en-
deavour to find you and this may wake you up; but from 
the fact that my endeavour has affected you in this way, 
it does not follow that I have made an attempt upon you. 
If I make an attempt upon you, then some of the effects 
that my act has upon you are in some sense intended. To 
see that this is so, we must focus upon still another 
feature of the content of endeavour. 
Consider the concept of a basic endeavour. NormaUy 
raising one's arm involves a basic endeavour. This means 
that, when you raise your arm, you endeavour to bring it 
about that your arm goes up, but you don't endeavour to 
bring about some other thing that, in turn, will bring it 
about that your arm goes up. 1 
One makes an immediate attempt upon a thing y if one 
makes a basic endeavour in order to affect y but not in 
order to bring about some other thing which will affect y. 
If I have deliberately kicked you, then I have made an 
immediate attempt upon you. But if I have thrown a 
stone at you, then I have made an immediate attempt, not 
upon you, but upon the stone. 
Immediate attempts, like other endeavours, may have 
too many transcendent objects. Consider the following 
situation. At dusk I see you and I also see a tree; I take 
you to be the tree that I see and I take the tree to be 
the person that I see. Suppose, now, I believe that the 
person I see is the thief. If what we have just said about 
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such that I believe you to be the thief, but also that the 
tree is such that I believe it to be the thief. For the tree 
is such that I believe it to be the person that I see, and 
I believe that the person that I see is the thief. (Strictly 
the consequence in question will not follow unless we 
assume that I am clever enough to put two and two to-
gether and thus to conclude that the person who stole 
my automobile is the person who stole my automobile. I 
ask you to assume this.) 
Now we have a problem. The problem has led at least 
one philosopher to deny that 'actions directed upon con-
crete objects are explainable in part by beliefs directed 
upon those objects'. 2 Here, then, we have a scepticism 
about the possibility of applying theory to practice. 
Suppose I make an immediate attempt to grasp the 
person who stole my automobile. On which thing will I 
make the attempt - you or the tree? It will not do to say 
merely that I will make my attempt upon the thing that I 
believe to be the thief. For my belief has too many tran-
scendent objects. Both you and the tree are thought by 
me to be the thief. To decide which of the two transcend-
ent objects is to be the object of my immediate attempt, 
we must consider certain further relations between these 
objects and the content of my endeavour. 
These further relations pertain to the way in which the 
person identifies the things which are the objects of his 
endeavour. Hence perception is involved. Some philo-
sophers would stop here and say that the rest is obvious. 
But the rest is by no means obvious. Just how is percep-
tion involved? In our example, I perceive both you and 
the tree. How, then, is any particular one of these things 
singled out? 
An object of perception is singled out as being the 
thing that is appearing to one in a certain way. Whal 
way, then? There are, after all, indefinitely many accur-
ate and unique descriptions of the way in which any 
particular thing appears to one at any particular time. But 
most of these will not be known to the perceiver. The 
way of appearing by means of which one singles out the 
object of perception is that way of appearing which is 
self-presenting to the perceiver. It is a way of being 
appeared to which is necessarily such that, for any 
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subject x, if x is appeared to in that way and if x 
considers the question whether he is appeared to in that 
way, then it is evident to x that he is appeared to in 
that way. 
Now, I think, we can say how the content of endeavour 
and the ways in which one is appeared to may assure us, 
with respect to any particular thing, that that thing will 
be the object of an immediate attempt. I suggest the 
following principle: 
For every x, if (i) x is the thing that is appearing H to 
S, (ii) being appeared H to is self-presenting, and (iii) 
S makes a basic endeavour to have the property of 
being such that the thing that is now appearing H to 
him be a thing that he A •s, then S makes an immediate 
attempt to A x. 
Suppose that the tree, but not you, is the thing that ap-
pears to me to be moving. And suppose also that I make a 
basic endeavour to be such that the thing that I grasp is 
the thing that appears to me to be moving. Then I will 
make an attempt upon the tree and not upon you. And if 
my endeavour is successful, its theoretical content will 
have made contact with reality. 
This is the way in which theory first meets up with 
practice. 
Notes 
1. The following two definitions give us a more precise 
statement: 
S endeavours to bring it about that y has the property 
of being F, and does so in order that z will have the 
property of being G =Df S endeavours to bring it about 
(i) that y is F and (ii) that his endeavour that y be F 
will contribute causally to z being G. 
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S makes a basic endeavour to F =Df S endeavours to be 
F; and there is nothing that S endeavours to do in 
order that he have the property of being F. 
In making a basic endeavour, then, one adopts an end but 
no means to that end. 
2. See Baker 1983, p. 363. 
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Rechtsgefilhl and the Rule of Law 
Roger Scruton 
Nicht das RechtsgefiJhl { erzeugt] das Recht 
. sondern das Recht das Rechtsgefiihl. 
(R. von Jhering, Der Zweck im Recht). 
1. Preamble 
Erwin Riezler, writing in 1925, distinguished three ideas 
expressed by the word •Rechtsgef!Jhl': 
1. The feeling for what the law is (Ge/fl.hi /11.r das, was 
Recht ist); 
2. The feeling for what the law ought to be (GefiJhl fllr 
das, was Recht sein soll); 
3 The feeling that only what is in accordance with law 
(das dem Recht Entsprechende) should happen. 1 
In translating 'Recht' as 'law' I have, of course, consider-
ably narrowed Riezler's meaning. Even so, what I have 
said does not make clear sense to an English reader, who 
is likely to be puzzled, not only by the idea of law ex-
pressed in those three descriptions, but also by Riezler's 
insensitivity to the distinction between 'feeling for' and 
•reeling that', the second of which, unlike the first, de-
notes a 'propositional attitude'. Nor does Riezler's sub-
sequent discussion, couched in the discredited terms of 
introspectionist psychology, do anything to reassure the 
sceptical reader that something identifiable and important 
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is meant by Rechtsgeff1hl - that this is not just another 
of those ubiquitous Geff1hle with which the German genius 
for legend has encumbered the world, a close cousin of 
GenossensgeffJhl, Heimatsge/f1hl, Sprachgef/Jhl and the 
Gef/Jhl that my academic status depends upon my drivel-
ling on about Ge/lJhle. 
At various stages in his discussion, however, Riezler 
compares the German jurisprudent's Rechtsgef!Jhl to the 
'sense of justice' described by Aristotle in the Nicomach-
ean Ethics, and also to the 'instinct' for 'natural justice', 
which Ulpian unphilosophically attributes to the entire 
animal kingdom. 2 He is helped in this by the well-known 
ambiguities of the word I Recht', which spans 'right•, 'law' 
and 'justice' as these are known to English speakers. I do 
not blame Riezler for exploiting these ambiguities, any 
more than I blame him for linking Rechtsge/llhl with the 
sense of justice. On the contrary, it seems to me that the 
German word 'Recht' is not as misleading as it at first 
seems, and that if it refers to so many separable things, 
it is perhaps because these things are, in the last ana-
lysis, not truly separate. Riezler may also be right in his 
assumption, that a study of Rechtsge/lJhl will lead us to 
see a connection between the sense of justice and the 
operation of law. 
Nevertheless, the sceptical flourish with which this 
paper begins must be completed. Let it be said, therefore, 
that to an English speaker the distinction between law 
and justice is not merely apparent: it is flagrant. Unless 
we are talking of 'natural law' (whose very existence is 
doubtful), it is clear that law is one thing, and justice 
another. Not only are there unjust laws; there is also law-
less justice. The existence of law may generate a 'sense 
of justice', as Jhering's remark suggests; or laws and the 
sense of justice may be mutually dependent, as Riezler 
himself prefers to argue: 3 but these suggestions are far 
from obvious. 
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2. Defining Law 
Definitions of law depend upon the purpose of the de-
finer. The sociologist, wishing to explain social behaviour, 
sees law as a system of causes; the jurist, wishing to 
understand legal argument, sees it as a system of reasons. 
Part of the appeal of legal positivism - at least in the 
forms bequeathed to us by Bentham, Austin and Kelsen 4 
- is that it presents us with a theory of law that is use-
ful equally to the sociologist and to the jurist: a theory 
which shows how a reason might also be a cause. To 
describe 'command' as the fundamental ingredient in a 
legal system, is to suggest both an explanation of legal 
behaviour, and a theory of judicial argument. The judge, 
according to the positivist, is working out and applying 
the consequences of general commands. One question 
which troubles the philosopher is, who issues those com-
mands, and for what purpose? For only if we know the 
purpose can we discuss the rationality of an act. 
The purpose of an action must be sharply distinguished 
from the 'function' assigned to it by the sociologist. Many 
human activities have 'functions' in the sociologist's 
sense, even if they have no purpose (love, for example). 
Furthermore, the sociologist might assign a 'function' to 
an inherently purposeful activity without thereby iden-
tifying the purpose. For example, a sociologist might de-
scribe law as an instrument of 'social control' (such, for 
example, is Weber's theory). 'Social control' is not a pur-
pose that a judge either has or ought to have. But that 
does not imply the falsehood of the sociologist's analysis, 
which concerns not individual intentions but social results. 
As a matter of fact, the Weberian theory is most im-
plausible. 'Social control' may sound like a description of 
the function of criminal law, but it seems hardly apt as a 
description of the law of contract or the law of tort. In 
these areas - and indeed throughout civil law - adjudic-
ation has the effect of resolving conflict - and if it also 
'controls' people, it is only because it resolves the. con-
flicts that would otherwise divide them. Again, 'resolution 
of conflict' does not describe the judge's intention: but it 
is an apt description of his long term effect. Indeed, it is 
63 
Rechtsgefflhl and the Rule of Law 
arguable that this resolution of conflict is a primary 
function of the law - at least, in those cases where sov-
ereignty is not in doubt and where peace prevails. (And 
there is no reason to suppose that law retains its normal 
function in times of war, or in the aftermath of con-
quest.) In what follows, therefore, I shall consider the 
operation of law in the resolution of conflict, and I shall 
attempt to describe the precious artefact known as the 
'rule of law' or Rechtsstaat. l shall then return to the 
subject of Rechtsgefahl, and offer certain tentative con-
clusions concerning its nature and importance. 
Conflict may occur between individuals, between cor-
porations, between individuals and corporations or be-
. . 
tween either and the state. (I use the term •corporation' 
loosely, to cover any body that performs collective actions 
which are subject to adjudication.) When a conflict is 
brought before the law it is resolved by the decision of 
a judge (who may again be an individual or a corporate 
body). This is the first important feature of law, and one 
which distinguishes it from war (the other most frequently 
used procedure for the resolution of conflict). In war the 
two parties marshall their forces, and contend by force 
for the outcome. Of course, there is also a law of war: 
but it is a law which operates only when law itself has 
failed. The dispute is then no longer before a judge, but 
solely between the parties. 
Even when there is no trial of strength or violent con-
frontation, the procedure for settling a conflict may be 
nearer to war than to adjudication. Thus if one party is 
so strong that it would be foolish to resist him, he will 
dictate the outcome of any conflict. But this does not 
mean that his wilt is law: it means rather that law need 
have no place in his dealings. 
The existence of a 'judge' is by no means distinctive of 
law. Various other procedures also involve the inter-
vention of a third party: conciliation/ for example, or 
•good offices' in International Law. Moreover, the decision 
of the third party may be decisive - as in 'arbitration' -
without the procedure thereby becoming part of law. It 
is, however, a principle of English law that, when a third 
party is in the sovereign position enjoyed by an arbitra-
tor, his decision must satisfy the formal requirements of 
·i. 
I t; . 
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•natural justice' (used here as a technical term of a~m.in-
istrative law). Should these requirements not be satisfied, 
then the decision will be set aside by a court o~ law_. \If 
arbitration sometimes is mistaken for adjudication, it is 
partly because of this possibility of appeal to law.) In . 
order for a procedure to have the character of law, certarn 
other conditions must be satisfied. First, there must be ~n 
application of general rules, specifying •jural interests', m 
the sense made familiar by Hohfeld. 5 These rules must .~e-
fine the rights, liabilities, privileges, duties_ a~d ~mmunities 
of those who are subject to the judge's junsd1ct1~n .. 
Secondly the decision of the judge must be binding. It 
must have the character not of a recommendation but of . 
a command. Whether the command may also be enforced 18 
a separate question, although it is reasonable to suppose 
that •voluntary law' is an unusual kind of law, an~ one 
that depends upon very special circumstances fo~ it~ ap-
plication. In the normal case, the judge's authority 1s als~ 
a form of power, bestowed by the state which upholds his 
judgment. 
3. Procedural Constraints 
Here, then, is a first, minimal description of a lega~ ?ro-
cess: the application to human conflict of rules .ctet:1mng 
'jural interests', by a judge whose decision is bmd~ng on 
the parties and in the normal case enforceable !gainst . 
them. There are also certain procedural constra1~ts_ whi~h 
are widely understood to be intrinsic to the admm1strat1on 
of justice, and which are certainly fundamental !o the. 
"rule of law'. Three in particular should be mentioned. 
(1) Judicial independence. The judge should be guided in 
his judgment only by the facts of the case and th~ law 
which he applies to them, and must therefore be inde-
pendent of the parties. There are very few legal systems 
in the modern world which satisfy this condition. ln most 
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ive barrier between the individual citizen and the state. 
Often the citizen comes before him as the subject of a 
'political trial', and the judge is instructed by the pro-
secution as to the verdict which he must, on pain of dis-
missal, deliver. 
Some purists argue that a procedure in which the judge 
is controlled by one of the parties cannot be called law. 
However. we should be less concerned by the word 'law' 
than by the facts that it is used to denote. And there are 
clearly many distinctions to be made: within the limits 
.laid down by the prosecution, the judge may still make 
real legal distinctions, even when the final outcome is 
largely predetermined. It is perhaps best to say that a 
trial in which the judge is not independent is a travesty 
of justice, although it may on occasion be a genuine ap-
plication of the law. 
Judicial independence may be diminished in a variety 
of ways, and is clearly never more than a matter of de-
gree. Judges frequently have financial interests, and per-
sonal connections, which make it difficult for them to 
separate themselves from the outcome of a case. In Eng-
lish law the presence of such interests and connections is 
always a ground for appeal against a verdict, on grounds 
of •natural justice' (again used in its technical sense, to 
denote a set of common law rules with a precise and long-
established application in administrative law). Socialists 
sometimes argue that judicial independence, under 'capital-
ist' conditions, can never be achieved, since the judges 
will always have a class interest which aligns them with a 
certain party to politically decisive conflicts. To assess 
such a claim is extremely difficult: often it is presented 
as a tautology, which can be overthrown by no empirical 
evidence. If, however, what is meant is that judges will 
show a marked disposition to settle disputes in favour of 
the 'middle class' and against members of the 'working 
class', then, not only has this claim yet to be estab-
lished, 6 but it is not at all clear what would follow from 
it, should it be true. 
I place this 'rule of judicial independence' first, not 
only because of its crucial importance in the theory of 
government, but also because it is the decisive factor in 
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the genesis of RechtsgeftJh/. Whether or not there can be 
systems of law without judicial independence, there cer-
tainly can be neither respect for the law, nor a guarantee 
of justice, if citizens have no prior assurance that their 
case will be judged on its merits. 
(2) Evidence. Intimately connected with the idea of im-
partiality, and indeed not really separable from it, is the 
idea of truth. In many languages the words for truth and 
justice are etymologically connected: the adjectives 'juste', 
'right' and 'recht' can be used to convey either notion, 
and in Slavonic languages the connection is even more 
explicit. e Pravda' denotes truth, 'prtivo' right or law. and 
some such abstraction as 'spravedlnost' justice.) The in-
stinct that led Kant towards truth telling as the primary 
example of the categorical imperative is by no means the 
least of his moral insights. The prime instance of injust-
ice is a verdict based on a falsehood - as when a man is 
imprisoned for a crime that he did not commit, or a per-
son loses his rights on grounds that do not apply to him. 
The second decisive feature of judicial procedure is there-
fore the disinterested search for the truth. We might call 
this the 'rule of evidence', although its implications range 
more widely than the concept of evidence employed in 
legal writings. 
(3) Legality. Of equal importance to the rule of evidence 
is the rule that law should be properly formulated, and 
the citizen propoperly forewarned. H. L. A. Hart refers in 
this connection to certain principles of 'legality', which 
the legislator ought to follow or try to follow in the enun-
ciation of laws. ' Laws, he argues, should be i) general, 
with no arbitrarily defined exemptions; ii) free from 
ambiguities and obscurities; iii) publicly promulgated, so 
that those subject to their jurisdiction can be reasonably 
expected to know of their existence; and iv) not retro-
spective. 
Each of those conditions raises difficulties of its own. i) 
clearly raises the problems encountered by Hare's the-
ory of the 'universalisability' of moral judgments, and in 
particular the problem of triviality: how are we to prevent 
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ive barrier between the individual citizen and the state. 
Often the citizen comes before him as the subject of a 
'political trial', and the judge is instructed by the pro-
secution as to the verdict which he must, on pain of dis-
missal, deliver. 
Some purists argue that a procedure in which the judge 
is controlled by one of the parties cannot be called law. 
However, we should be less concerned by the word 'law' 
than by the facts that it is used to denote. And there are 
clearly many distinctions to be made: within the limits 
.laid down by the prosecution, the judge may still make 
real legal distinctions, even when the final outcome is 
largely predetermined. It is perhaps best to say that a 
trial in which the judge is not independent is a travesty 
of justice, although it may on occasion be a genuine ap-
plication of the law. 
Judicial independence may be diminished in a variety 
of ways, and is clearly never more than a matter of de-
gree. Judges frequently have financial interests, and per-
sonal connections, which make it difficult for them to 
separate themselves from the outcome of a case. In Eng-
lish law the presence of such interests and connections is 
always a ground for appeal against a verdict, on grounds 
of 'natural justice' (again used in its technical sense, to 
denote a set of common law rules with a precise and long-
established application in administrative law). Socialists 
sometimes argue that judicial independence, under 'capital-
ist' conditions, can never be achieved, since the judges 
will always have a class interest which aligns them with a 
certain party to politically decisive conflicts. To assess 
such a claim is extremely difficult: often it is presented 
as a tautology, which can be overthrown by no empirical 
evidence. If, however, what is meant is that judges will 
show a marked disposition to settle disputes in favour of 
the •middle class' and against members of the 'working 
class', then, not only has this claim yet to be estab-
lished, 6 but it is not at all clear what would follow from 
it, should it be true. 
I place this 'rule of judicial independence' first, not 
only because of its crucial importance in the theory of 
government, but also because it is the decisive factor in 
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the genesis of Rechtsgefilhl. Whether or not there can be 
systems of law without judicial independence, there cer-
tainly can be neither respect for the law, nor a guarantee 
of justice, if citizens have no prior assurance that their 
case will be judged on its merits. 
(2) Evidence. Intimately connected with the ide~ o~ im-
partiality, and indeed not really separable from 1t, 1s the 
idea of truth. In many languages the words for truth and 
justice are etymologically connected: the adjectives 'juste', 
'right' and 'recht' can be used to convey either notion, 
and in Slavonic languages the connection is even more 
explicit. ('Pravda' denotes truth, 'prtivo' right or law, and 
some such abstraction as 'spravedlnost' justice.) The in-
stinct that led Kant towards truth telling as the primary 
example of the categorical imperative is by no me~n.s the 
least of his moral insights. The prime instance of tnJust-
ice is a verdict based on a falsehood - as when a man is 
imprisoned for a crime that he did not commit, or a per-
son loses his rights on grounds that do not apply to him. 
The second decisive feature of judicial procedure is there-
fore the disinterested search for the truth. We might call 
this the 'rule of evidence'. although its implications range 
more widely than the concept of evidence employed in 
legal writings. 
(3) Legality. Of equal importance to the rule of evidence 
is the rule that law should be properly formulated, and 
the citizen propoperly forewarned. H. L. A. Hart refers in 
this connection to certain principles of 'legality', which 
the legislator ought to follow or try to follow in the enun-
ciation of laws. 7 Laws. he argues, should be i) general, 
with no arbitrarily defined exemptions; ii) free from 
ambiguities and obscurities; iii) publicly promulgated, so 
that those subject to their jurisdiction can be reasonably 
expected to know of their existence; and iv) not retro-
spective. 
Each of those conditions raises difficulties of its own. i) 
clearly raises the problems encountered by Hare's the-
ory of the 'universalisability' of moral judgments, and in 
particular the problem of triviality: how are we to prevent 
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the condition being satisfied by any law whatsoever. how-
ever arbitrary its conception, provided only that it be 
suitably worded? ii) is no clearer, and no easier to apply, 
than the ideas of 'ambiguity' and 'obscurity' employed in 
its formulation. iii) (a favourite principle of John Locke's) 
may seem marginally more clear; and likewise iv). How-
ever. on one interpretation of judicial procedure, laws 
are not, and cannot be, determinately known in advance 
of their application, and every decision of a "hard case' 
involves legislation which is inherently retrospective. (The 
second of those claims, if not the first, is hotly disputed 
by Ronald Dworkin.) 8 In which case, how are iii) and iv) 
to be satisfied? Even if we leave aside the 'hard cases•, it 
is undeniable that, in almost every legal system, retro-
spective legislation occurs, and must occur if society is 
not to be undermined by disloyal litigation. (In Britain. 
for example, fiscal legislation acts retrospectively, from 
the time of the first presentation of the budget proposals, 
and before Parliamentary approval has made these pro-
posals into law. It is obvious why this rule should be 
adopted.} 9 Moreover, common law, which remains the 
basis of our own (English} legal system, has the character 
not of a public pronouncement, but of a slow judicial ' 
discovery. 
Notwithstanding those and other difficulties, it seems 
difficult to deny the intuitive plausibility of Hart's con-
ditions, or of conditions true to the spirit of those laid 
down by Hart. We feel that there is a norm of generality 
and precision to which law ought to conform, if it is not 
to become an instrument of arbitrary coercion. We feel 
that secret laws (of the kind that existed in Nazi Germany 
and in Stalin's Russia} are grossly defective, and that re-
trospective legislation (as opposed to retrospective inter-
pretation) is acceptable only in special cases, which must 
be openly discussed, publicly justified, and properly 
announced. No doubt other conditions could be added to 
those offered by Hart, 1 0 and no doubt Hart is unduly 
influenced by a conception of legislation, and insuffi-
ciently sensitive to the workings of the common law. But 
the further question arises as to why we should expect 
law to conform to a 'rule of legality' in the first place? 
It seems to me that a very good answer is contained in 
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the sociological premise from which my discussion began. 
If law is really to have the effect of resolving, rather 
than creating, conflict, then it should be as certain and 
predictable as possible. Secret laws are evidently a source 
of social conflict, and could never be used in its cure: the 
same goes for retrospective laws, and for laws which 
arbitrarily divide the populace into those who must obey 
them and those who need not. 
We may, then, enunciate three ground-rules of legal 
procedure: the rule of judicial independence, whose aim 
is impartiality; the rule of evidence, whose aim is truth; 
and the rule of legality, whose aim is to establish the exist 
ence of jural interests prior to the act which encroaches 
upon them. 
Some wish to argue that 'representation' is a necessary 
part of adequate legal procedure. The pervasive existence 
of representation certainly changes the character of the 
law, in making every party to a conflict an expert in its 
adjudication; none the less, it is not a necessary feature 
of the adjudication itself. In some systems - the Shari'a, 
for example - representation is the exception rather than 
the rule, and in any case need not have the form of an 
intervention by experts. Exactly what role should be 
played by representation in the 'rule of law• is the ref ore 
a question that I shall leave unanswered. 
4, Law and Rule 
The three ground-rules do not suffice to characterise the 
nature of law. Something must also be said about the 
nature of the laws themselves, as these are applied in 
court. A first attempt at classification would distinguish 
custom, rule and principle. Custom is not a part of the 
law, although it may serve as a guideline interpreting 
ambiguous statutes and decisions. Rule is the essence of 
the law, while principle is an additional component - a 
reference beyond the prescribed rules, to a body of con-
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which some (notably Dworkin) wish to make part of the 
law itself. (Dworkin wavers between saying that principle 
is part of the law, in England and the US say, and saying 
that it ought to be. He also wavers in his description of 
principle, and in particular in his interpretation of the 
word 'political': a political right tends to mean 'a repres-
entation of the law as it would be if it were entirely in 
the control of the New York Review of Books'. I shall not 
be able to discuss Dworkin in detail, but I shall have 
more to say in due course about principles.) 1 1 
Most people would agree that the third component 
principle is not an essential, even if it is a desirable, ele-
ment in all judicial procedure. And the correct attitude 
to custom is surely to say that, whatever its final import-
ance, it owes its life to the rules and takes its meaning 
from the fact that it arises in the application of the 
rules. (Thus there can be rules without customs, but not 
legal customs in the absence of legal rules.) The idea that 
principles are so important stems in part from the exist-
ence in Western systems of law of a procedure of appeal: 
in other words, they are a reflection in thought of the 
existence in fact of a 'higher court'. To cut a long story 
short, it is the rules alone that are essential. 
A legal rule does not have to be written. Nor does it 
have to be fully known to the judge. In a British court, 
the judge is guided by the doctrine of precedent, accord-
ing to which the rule is embodied in the precedents, but 
not necessarily explicitly stated there. (This is so, at 
least, if Parliament has not legislated on the issue.) The 
common law doctrine of precedent still applies, and when 
the barrister argues that the judge ought to distinguish 
the present case, he is arguing for a particular interpreta-
tion of the precedent, according to which the rule upon 
which it was decided does not apply to the present in-
stance. 
As I briefly remarked, there is a conflict in the offing 
between the common law doctrine of precedent and the 
third of our ground-rules: the rule of legality. For if the 
law is not known to the judge - if he too has to discover 
it in the course of adjudication - how could it have been 
known to the ignorant layman who stands before him? 
However, it should not be thought that this conflict is pe-
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culiar to common law. Every serious legal system has a 
similar problem - which will be called a problem of inter-
pretation. Even if the law is all written down in statutes 
(or. if not written down, then recorded in some other 
way, as in the memorised verse-forms used by our Saxon 
ancestors and by the cities of ancient Greece), it still 
must be interpreted. And that too may require a great 
deliberation in the light of the particular facts of the 
particular case. The question 'Is this murder?'. or 'ls this 
negligence?' will exercise the minds of judges under what-
ever legal system, and it is impossible to avoid the con-
clusion that the ideal of a publicly enunciated and publicly 
certain law is no more than an ideal. 
The essential features of a legal rule are consistency, 
applicability, and relevance. A rule is consistent if it is 
always applied in the same way: i.e. so as to yield the 
same outcome on the same facts. Whatever difficulties 
that last sentence may contain (and all readers of Witt-
genstein will be familiar with them) 1 2 are difficulties 
peculiar not to law, but to the idea of consistency. A 
rule is applicable if there are actual situations, occurring 
in the normal course of the given society, when it might 
be invoked. (A system of rules governing the breeding of 
chimeras and the navigation of the stars would not be a 
system of law.) A rule is relevant if the situation to 
which it applies is an actual or potential source of human 
conflict. Criminal law contains a paradigm of legal relev-
ance, since its central core derives directly from the 
moral sense of man - the sense that murder, robbery, 
fraud, rape and violence cannot go unavenged. In other 
words, criminal law records a natural desire for retribu-
tion, and if the law does not provide that retribution, the 
offended party will. Civil law involves the resolution of 
more recondite difficulties: such as the division of prop-
erty, and the recompense for injury. But again it provides 
a solution to a problem in which one party is in funda-
mental conflict with the other. 
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5. Law and the Sense of Justice 
Hume argued that, if we could but abstract from all our 
interests, and look impartially, and with complete under-
standing, on the deeds of men, we should agree in our 
judgment as to what was right and what was wrong, since 
we should be guided only by that universal sentiment of 
benevolence which is common to all. Hume's thought is 
tantamount to the following: even in the absence of legal 
rules, we can put ourselves in the position of a judge, 
and attempt to obey the ground-rules of adjudication. And 
then we shall agree in our judgments as to what is right 
and wrong. I shall define the •sense of justice' as the 
disposition to carry out this thought experiment, and to 
be guided by its result: the disposition to put oneself in 
an adjudicative position, whether or not the matter in 
question is governed by law. More metaphysical versions 
of Hume's thought are available - notably Kant's theory 
that the rational being is compelled by reason to put him-
self in an adjudicative position, and that when he does 
so his thought issues automatically in laws that are uni-
versally binding. It is not necessary to go so far as Kant 
in order to recognise that law is as much the product as 
the producer of the •sense of justice•. 
Modern social and political thinkers are frequently 
misled by a false image of the law - an image that has 
been prevalent since the eighteenth century but which is 
at variance with the historical experience of Europe. 
According to this image, the business of the judge is to 
apply law, not to make it, and law itself stems from the 
legislative decisions of a sovereign body. The rules are 
issued in the form of commands, which express the •wm 
of the sovereign' in explicit and generalised form. It is 
obvious from a first glance at the history of European 
law that this image totally misrepresents the way in which 
our laws have developed. Not only the Common Law of 
England, but Roman Law and the codified systems of 
Europe have their ultimate origins in judicial decisions, 
rather than in legislative chambers. The criminal law, and 
t~e root Jaws of the civil code, derive from Jong tradi-
tions of decision-making which took place without the 
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benefit (or, to be more accurate, without the curse) of 
sovereign legislation. At some point almost every code can 
be traced back to certain core conceptions which have 
judicial precedent as their sole and sufficient authority. 
And rules which are applied through courts that have no 
anchorage in historical precedent are open to marked 
defects some of which I discuss below. But we should 
bear cl~sely in mind the distinction - emphasised to great 
effect by Hayek 1 3 - between law and legislation, and 
should recognise, too, that legislation is not, and canno! 
be, the basis of a legal system, nor can it generate, of its 
own accord, a rule of law. . . 
The above sketch is very inadequate, but 1t gives us 
some idea as to what a legal system is (even if it does 
not quite justify the word •system'). It should be obvious 
that the sense of justice as I have defined it has nothing 
to do with the conception of distributive justice elabor-
ately specified by Rawls, 1 4 (or rather, it has in _co~m~n 
only the basic idea of impartiality). A sense of Justice 1s 
manifest not in some thought experiment designed to tell 
us how t'he total product of a society should be distrib-
uted among its members, but in the ~abit o~ looking u~on 
individual transactions and conflicts impartially, and with 
an eye to the truth. I have tenta!ive~y su~?ested th_at . . 
there is a continuity between this d1spos1t1on and Judicial 
procedure under a rule of law. 
6. Personality 
There are two further important features of the rule of 
Jaw, as this has developed in European civilisation, which 
I shall call •personality' and 'concretion'. My discussion of 
these features will be directed in part against the tradi-
tion in sociological thought, represented most powerfully 
by Weber, which sees law as a paradigm of •abs~ract and 
impersonal' relations between sovereign and subJect: 
The work of von Gierke in Germany and of Maitland 
in England made abundantly clear that the politics of 
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European nations cannot really be understood without 
reference to ideas of collective liability and collective 
right. 1 5 Collective agency is recognised by Roman Law 
(with its doctrine of the corporate persona 1 6 ). by the 
Genossenschaftsrecht of medieval Germany, by Canon 
Law, and by the brilliant and baffling English law of 
trusts. which manages to give legal reality to collective 
agents without treating them as corporate 'persons' in the 
sense of Roman Law. All those legal systems acknowledge 
more or less explicitly that the features of individual 
human beings whereby we are moved to praise and blame 
them. to accord to them rights and liabilities. to oppose 
them ~nd to ally ourselves with them, can be displayed by 
collective entities. A university, a trading company a 
club, an institution, the state itself - all can be so 'struc-
tured as to possess legal rights and liabilities and are so 
structured in many systems of law. (It should be noted 
that the term 'university' is borrowed from the •univer-
s~t~s• of ~o~an Law: which denotes the principal form of 
c1v1l association bearing corporate personality.) A trading 
company, for example, can perform actions: these actions 
reflect decisions made on its behalf which are themselves 
rationally based. People are affected by these actions and 
their rights and privileges may be safeguarded or thr~at-
ened by them. A company has rights in law - it can own 
things, buy things and sell them; it may possess rights of 
way and usufruct, rights of light, air, water, rights of 
~epresentation,_ an~ so on. It also possesses liabilities. (It 
1s a general prmc1pal that you don't have rights without 
having liabilities towards those who must respect them.) 
Indeed,_ all the categories of 'jural interest' seem to apply 
as readily to corporations as they apply to individual men 
and women. 
. A great amount of ink has been spilled over the ques-
tion w~ether the corporate person is 'fiction' or •reality•. 
Von Gierke endowed the Genossenschaf t with dignity, 
v~lue and moral identity beyond the reach of any indi-
vidual. In reaction, jurists have tended to set corporations 
to one side, as derivative, artificial - even delusory. This 
~ttempt seems to me to be wholly misguided. Not only is 
it ~egal n~nsense (the rights and liabilities of corporations 
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"also moral nonsense. The idea of a corporatio~ ~orres-
' ponds to an independent moral reality. ~soc1at1ons are_ 
the indispensable object of human allegiance, _the ~rche 
type of all the wider loyalties from whic? s~c1~ty _ 1s. 
generated and upon which the state and its Junsd1~t1on 
depend. Even if there were no legal i~ea of collecti~e 
identity, there would still be a moral 1d~a. And_ until the 
moral idea is given legal reality it remains outs~d.e the 
deliberations through which our bonds are fortified and 
our conflicts resolved. . 
Collectives may act rightly or wrongly. Without a law 
that can hold them to account, and force upon them COSt5 d · we can 
that are greater than the benefit of wrong om~, 
have no protection against their power. And w1thou_t a law 
that can establish and protect their interests, collec!ive 
agents are at the mercy of fraud, theft and _va!"dahsm. A 
law of collective agency both protects association a~d at 
the same time limits its power. Through the opera~ion of 
this law associations become institutions, and fleeting am-
bitions become sources of life, confidence and value .. 
The greatest of all collective agents - the state - 15 1 
not only a person in International Law, but also a mora 
person whose relations to us are of ever greater concern 
as its ~ower increases. A legal system that lacks the con-
ceptual apparatus whereby the personality of the s~te c9: 
be represented, cannot provide a rule of law. English la 
has a certain difficulty in this matter, and prefers !o 
speak not of the 'state' but of the 'crown'. It describes 
't a •cor-
the crown, in language of lamentable obscun Y, as . e 
poration sole' - i.e. a corporation which at any one tttn tis 
has at most one member. 1 ' Nevertheless, however unsa -
factory this device its intention is clear: to separate_ the f 
collective agency o'r the state from the indivi~ua~ wi~l 0 
the monarch, and to subject the former to adJudicati0 "?;s 
In other words, the purpose is to subject the state to 1 ·t 
own law and to make it no better than an equal when 1 
is challe:iged by the individual plaintiff. • 
If there is to be a rule of law, then legal personalitY f 
(or its equivalent) must be assigned to the real source~ 0 
collective agency, and not to the facades through ~hich 
they disguise their actions. The large p~wers and :ter::: 
that operate in society must be made directly ans era 
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for their actions. If such powers remain unanswerable, 
while being the principal agents behind the state, then 
we might reasonably say that government has become 
'impersonal'. The most important example of impersonal 
government is that of the one-party totalitarian state, 
under which the principal agent of change - the Party -
possesses no answerability at all, and usually makes this 
quite clear by defining itself in terms of its 'leading' role. 
While totalitarian systems of law recognise corporations of 
a kind - such as universities and even trading companies 
- these are for the most part facades: crucial decisions 
are invariably made on their behalf by the ruling Party 
which, while acting through them, escapes any liability 
for the conflicts that they cause. In such circumstances, 
not only is the state above the law, but all major forms 
of collective action are likewise unjudiciable. This is a 
paradigm of what I mean by 'impersonal' government, 
and to the extent that government becomes impersonal, 
to that extent do the main social conflicts become irresol-
uble through law, and to that extent does the rule of law 
break down. What seems like law is really (to parody 
Clausewitz) war by other means. 
A bureaucracy may be either personal or impersonal 
in the above sense. In both cases commands are carried 
out by officers appointed to specific functions. Yet in one 
case the officers can be controlled only from a point 
above them in the hierarchy of power: in the other case 
they can be controlled from a point below, through the 
intermediary of law. (Even in the hands of the underdog, 
law should be an instrument, not of influence, but of 
control, to use the sociologist's well-worn distinction.) 
As I have indicated, English law has to a great extent 
stood aloof from the Roman law of corporations, toler-
ating the proliferation of unincorporated associations, 
whose actions, rights and liabilities it has nevertheless 
been able to adjudicate through the law of trusts; The 
device of the trust depends in its turn upon the dual 
nature of English law, with the system of 'equity' (close 
to the philosopher's 'natural justice') always taking pre-
cedence over the system of law. Legal systems that do 
not enjoy such sophisticated concepts may compel associa-
tions to incorporate, so that collective action will not escape 
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the net of adjudication. Or they may develop other con-
ceptions - such as the Islamic waqf - through which to 
create rights and liabilities that are vested in no indi-
vidual person. (Each method has its own drawbacks, that 
of the waqf being that it permits assets to endure per-
petually without any individual having judiciable rights in 
them. This has been one of the major sources of disaster 
in the Islamic law of property, although there are also 
successful awqaf - such as the aflaj (water courses) of 
Oman - which could be easily administered in no other 
way.) 
The importance of these devices is twofold. First, as 
I have indicated, they give legal enactment to an inde-
pendent moral idea; secondly, they are an indispensable 
protection against conspiratorial power. The moral idea of 
the person is easy to grasp - although less easy to ana-
lyse. Clubs, societies, towns, guilds, unions, associations, 
churches, firms and nations - all have, in varying degrees, 
a moral personality in the eyes of those who deal with 
them. They have will, agency, responsibility, life and 
reason, and, as for their flesh and blood, we ourselves 
provide it. They are the objects of interpersonal attitudes 
- of love, hatred, admiration, contempt, affection, anger, 
gratitude, resentment, even of grief. To admit such facts 
is not to engage in outrageous metaphysics. It is simply to 
notice the world as it is. The Genossenschaf t has a real 
existence, and a real moral presence, independently of the 
law which bestows upon it the status of a person or a 
trust. (If you doubt this, then you should turn again to 
the greatest of all dramatic representations of the 
Genossenschaft - Wagner's Die Meistersinger. You will 
then see how much the individual human personality is 
enhanced and enriched by its encounter with the moral 
personality of free association.) 
By endowing associations with jural interests, the law 
extends its protection to an independently valued social 
organism, and one which already has those interests, or 
their moral equivalent, in the hearts and minds of those 
who encounter it. This process of protection is an essen-
tial part of the law's conflict-resolving function. It is a 
means whereby the state places itself at the disposal of 
d d .f . 1 a spontaneous social order, so as to en orse an rah y 1t. 
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Civil society, according to Hegel, owes its character to 
t~e ,corporatio~s, and it is by the abundance of free asso-
ciation, accordmg to Tocqueville, that the emerging soci-
ety of ;-\merica ,had limited the power of government, 1 9 
Such v1ews are 1mmensely controversial. But we should 
surely not be surprised by the hostility that revolutionary 
go~ern?1e~ts - which gain power by conspiracy and 
mamt~m ~t b! force - have shown towards the autono-
?1ous mst1tut1ons of civil society, or by the seemingly 
inexorable logk whereby such governments have one by 
one destroyed the private clubs, schools, charities, guilds 
and autonomous trade unions which seemed to generate 
powers that they could not control. (Nor is the tendency 
new. T~e Revolutionary Government of France issued a 
decl~ration on August 18th 1792, announcing that •a state 
that 1s t~uly free ought not to suffer within its heart any 
~orpora~1on, not even such as, being dedicated to public 
rnstructton, have merited well of the fatherland.' This was 
the prelude to one of the harshest acts of expropriation 
that had yet been conducted in the name of law.) Br th~ s~me_ token, we can see the value of personal 
law m elimmatmg conspiracy. In totalitarian states where 
the Party, de~pite being principal collective agent, •has 
?nly a defective legal personality, conspiracy remains an 
immovable component of public Hfe. Even in states which 
abhor conspiratorial government, and which do their best 
to make every coUective agent answerable before the law 
lar~e collect_ives will naturally try to bend the law in ' 
!~eir 2otn dJrection, and even to secure legislative immun-
1t!es. Under personal legality, all agents - the indi-
vidual, the corporation, even the state itself - come 
before the law as equals, entitled to equal consideration 
and equal respect. The law of collective personality is 
th_erefore an indispensable part of the rule of law. If we 
w1sh to use the word •personal' of a form of government, 
the~ :ve should .do far better justice to the idea conveyed 
by_ 1t 1f we use 1t to describe, not the charismatic leader-
:h1p ~f a warrior chieftain, but precisely that complex of 
J?ral 1~terests that our own systems of law have estab-
hshed m response to the perceived realities of human 
association. 
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7. Concretion 
The second important feature of our legal systems to 
which I should like to draw attention is the feature of 
'concretion'. It is perhaps useful to explain this term by 
means of an example. Consider section 203 of the Czec~o-
slovak criminal code. This tells us that those who •cons15t-
ently shirk honest employment and allow thero~elves t? be 
kept by somebody or acquire the means of existence in 
some other wicked manner are liable to punishment'. (All 
systems of •socialist law• include such a provision. some-
times known as the •anti-parasite' law.) Nowhere do~s the 
Czechoslovak Jaw define what •honest' employment is. 
what 'consistently' means, or what is a •wicked' manner· 
Nor is there a tradition of recorded adjudication that 
could settle the matter since judges have neither the 
power nor the indepe;dence to create binding preced: 
ents. 2 1 The law is crucially indeterminate - 'abstract 
if you like - and can therefore s~rve (as is of ~ourse 
intended) as an instrument of arbitrary control 1n the 
hands of the state. It seems to me that much 'socialist 
law' is in that sense abstract, and that its abstr~ctness 
arises partly because the judiciary has lost its independ-
ence The 'concretion' of a law comes, not from the law 
itself but from its application in the courts, in which the 
conc;ete circumstances of human conflict are allowed to 
determine the meaning of its terms (or, if you like. to 
determine the true nature of the law.) 
This requirement of legal concretion was righ~ly em-
phasised. and interestingly described. by Hegel, in The 
Philosophy of Right: 
Amongst the rights of the subjective consciousness are 
not only the publication of the laws ... but also the . 
possibility of ascertaining the actualisation ?f the law in 
a particular case (the course of the proceedings! :he 
legal argument, etc.) - i.e. the_p~blicity of _jud_1cial 
proceedings. The reason for this 1s that a trial 15 h 
implicitly an event of universal validity. and al thous 
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the particular content of the action affects the interests 
of the parties alone, its content, i.e. the right at issue 
and the judgment thereon, affects the interests of 
everybody. 2 2 
Hegel was hostile to common law, partly on the ground 
already mentioned, that it gives legislative capacities of 
an unforeseeable kind to the judge. 2 3 Nevertheless, the 
fact remains that the prime example of concrete law is 
common law. founded in the doctrines of precedent and 
stare decisis. Its rules are precisely not abstract but ab-
stracted from concrete decisions. The common law is an 
instance of a tradition, in which rational solutions emerge 
from the constant confrontation between human desire and 
recalcitrant reality. The principle governing such a law is 
no different from that which governs the law of a sover-
eign exercising a personal right of appeal. Indeed, it is 
understood in English law that the sovereign's personal 
adjudication is exercised precisely through the courts, and 
in particular through the Court of Chancery, which, al-
though it has been a Weberian 'office' since at least the 
twelfth century, is bound in the last instance only by 
precedents of its own. (And it is from the peculiar adju-
dication of the Court of Chancery that our law of equity 
and trusts derives.) 
An interesting corollary can now be drawn, concerning 
Weber's idea of 'legal-rational' legitimacy. It seems to me 
that a legal system that is impersonal, and which operates 
only through abstract laws, is precisely not rational at all. 
The prime feature of rational action is its subjection to 
correction in the light of the facts. In collective endeav-
ours, rationality emerges by the resolution of contending 
interests, and the emergence of a common pursuit that 
will secure the agreement, in so far as possible, of inter-
ested parties. Collective rationality is a process, and law 
is one of its instances. (Some, for example Hayek, argue 
that the market is another instance: but there is no need 
to accept this appealing idea, in order to agree with my 
conclusions.) The process of rational conflict-solving is 
possible, however, only if the most pcwerful interests 
(those which are the greatest generators of injustice and 
conflict) are answerable to the law (i.e. only if there is 
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personal government)~ and only if the law itself is. an-
swerable to the facts - to the concrete circumstances of 
adjudication. In other words, where there is impersonality 
and abstraction, there is a failure of collective rationality. 
Nothing can then be corrected. Indeed, you will find that, 
in- such circumstances, the person who attempts to voice 
an opposing view is invariably silenced, lest the smooth 
functioning of the mechanism be jeopardised by his pro-
tests. The failure of rationality consists in the liquidation 
of the dissenting voice. 
8. Summary 
Let us return now to our previous analysis of law. It can 
be seen, I hope, that impersonality and abstraction· are 
corruptions of the legal process. They are corruptions 
precisely because they let the greater powers through the 
net of adjudication, while leaving unprotected the spon-
taneous associations in which our Iif e and happiness re-
side. A central function of law - the resolution of con-
flict by adjudication - is then thwarted. Law cannot, in 
these circumstances, provide the preventative to war. 
(Martial law is appropriately called, in Polish as in 
French, a 'state of war'.) Our sketch of an analysis of 
law therefore implies that a legal record (in which con-
crete determinations are given to the interpretation of the 
rules), and a wide concept of corporate right and liability 
are essential to the true operation of law. We may there-
fore summarise our paradigm of law in the following 
terms. Law requires: 
(1) The placing of conflicts before a judge. 
(2) The application of rules defining jural interests. 
(3) The acceptance of the judge's decision as binding, 
and (in the normal case) as enforceable by a sovereign 
power. 
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(4_) ~be~ience to the three fundamental g d 1 
of adJudication: roun -ru es 
~~ the rule of judicial independence· ~~! the rule of evidence; • 
m) the rule of legality. 
(S) The use of rules which are 
i) consistent· 
ii) applicable~ 
iii) relevant. ' 
(6) _The adoption of a system which is 
1) personal; 
ii) concrete. 
The description is c b . . 
inition but an attem~~toe~~om~~ it IS ?Ot .a c~mplete def-
of one of its most . 1 enti Y ~n mst1tut1on in terms 
to the ex lanat' important functions, and with a view 
ha . P ion and evaluation of its effects I hope I 
ve given some grounds f th. k" . 
Which law like war dd or .m mg that the problem to 
human co~flict - i • a resses itself - the problem of 
have defined it tha~ ~etter serfved by a legal system as I 
atives. Y any O the more obvious altern-
9. Natural Law and Rechtsgefilhl 
It remains now to say s h" Which omet mg about the two problems 
• . co,n~er~ed_ me at the outset: first. the place of s:~r:h:~ ~h~r~~cip~~•• •n~tural law', •political rights' and 
natur~ extent a:~a ion ~ a legal system; secondly• the 
in fact d"ff meaning of Rechtsgefllhl. These are 
' i ~rent aspects of a single problem. • 
There 1s a tende · · • 
natural law as G t' nc~ rn Jun~prudence to think of 
which ar ro _1us th•~~s of It: a system of rules 
e exactly hke pos1t1ve laws in form, and differ 
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from them only in this: that their content can be justified 
by appeal to reason, without reference to the sovereign 
power. Roughly, they are laws which are, in Kant's sense, 
a priori valid. It is a step forward to recognise that all 
actual appeals to natural law are not appeals to law, but 
to something else which overrides it. Dworkin talks in 
this context of •principle', although he would probably 
not endorse the description •natural law' to ref er to his 
principles. He prefers, instead, to speak of •political 
rights', secured perhaps by a constitution, or at any rate, 
widely accepted as structural features of the body politic, 
which can be invoked in court in order to say: this can-
not be done. For Dworkin, these principles get invoked 
for the most part in •hard cases', where the law is inde-
terminate or in conflict with itself. Presumably, however, 
they could be invoked elsewhere, in order to throw out a 
law which conflicted with them. 
Both views - the traditional natural rights view, and 
the Dworkinian invocation of extra-systemic 'principles' 
- suppose that, in the course of adjudication, something 
else, beyond the rules, might be sensibly appealed to, and 
perhaps ought to be appealed to, if the resulting judgment 
is to have full title to our obedience. But why? What is it 
about a legal system, as I have so far described it, that 
requires completion in this way, and why is it a good 
thing so to complete it? If what is meant is that the law 
should conform to our moral sense, then that goes without 
saying. But the •should' there is moral, not legal. 
I propose instead another view of the 'natural laws' 
and •principles' that seem to lie dormant within adjudic-
ation. I suggest that these are really shadows cast by the 
procedure of adjudication itself. They are not independ-
ently existing laws which may be applied like any other. 
They are, rather, the procedures themselves, transformed 
into principles. Thus, we may talk of the 'right to a fair 
trial'; but we do not mean by this some separate legally 
defined right that might be added to a system of adjudic-
ation so as to make a real difference to it. We simply 
refer to a consequence of the system itself. Without the 
•right to a fair trial' there is no law. In the same way, 
we can speak of all the following as •rights•: 
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the right to impartial judgement (4, i); 
the right to the truth, and all that is entailed in that 
(4, ii); 
the right to do what no law forbids (4, iii); 
the right to be treated equally for an equal offence 
(5, i); 
the duty of corporations to answer for their acts 
(6, i). 
It is possible in this way to denote a schema of formal 
rights, corresponding to many of the 'natural rights' that 
have been traditionally recognised. 2 4 The important point, 
however, is that these rights are secured automatically by 
any genuine rule of law, as a consequence of legal pro-
cedure. Conversely, they cannot be protected without the 
creation of such a procedure. Genuine law and natural law 
may be no more separable than are a man and his shadow. 
If we now return to Hume's 'genealogy' of the sense of 
justice, we can begin to describe the fundamental contours 
of Rechtsgefahl. Someone for whom adjudication is the 
prime manner in which conflicts are resolved places him-
self when witnessing conflict in the position of the im-
partial judge. In doing so, he envisages, in his innermost 
sentiments, a procedure for resolving the conflict, which 
will conform to the demands of law. He will automatically 
think in terms of the 'rights' and 'liabilities' of the 
parties, and he will identify the parties according to an 
intuitive notion of personality which will be receptive to 
ideas of corporate right and corporate liability. He will be 
motivated to recognise certain 'formal' or 'natural rights', 
and above all the right to truth, as the basic principles 
from which his reasoning departs. And he will be constant-
ly comparing cases, trying to reconcile his judgement in 
this case with his judgement in another. If Hume is right, 
then the disposition to adopt the judicial posture is 
essentially common to human beings, and constitutes a 
fundamental part of their ability to sympathise. And if the 
conditions of legal order, as I have described them exist 
' . 
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then Rechtsge/lJhl will develop spontaneously. One might 
go further, and say that, without this feeling, men would 
not be able to achieve what it is most important for them 
to achieve: a vision of the social world that is through 
and through personal, concrete, informed by a sense of 
right and liability. Pace Weber, it is precisely law, 
properly understood, that educates us to that perception, 
and through law we are presented with an idea of 
legitimacy that is personal, responsible and of immediate 
application to the self. It is true that we can easily lose 
sight of this 'personality•. For law can become cumber-
some, overborne with written statutes and minute observ-
ances: like any human activity, it can be corrupted and 
turned against itself. But it is a virtue of law, that its 
faults are merely human. 
Notes 
I. Riezler 1969, pp. 7f. 
2. Ulpian, fr. I, section 3 D. de iust. et iure 1, l. Austin 
rightly scorns the idea of a law of justice acknowledged 
even by animals as •this most foolish conceit': Austin 
1911, p. 210. 
3. Riezler 1969, p, 42. 
4. Bentham 1789; Austin 191 l; Kelsen 1942. 
5. Hohfeld I 923, ch. 1. 
6. For evidence of judicial impartiality in the matter of 
'workers' rights', see O'Higgins and Partington 1969. 
7. See, for example, •Problems of the Philosophy of Law', 
in Hart 1983, p. 1J4. 
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8. For example at several places in Dworkin 1978. 
9. There are other far more dubious cases. however. Con-
sider the case of Burmah Oil Co. v. Lord Advocate, (1965) 
A.C.75, in which a claim for war damage compensation 
was set aside by the courts, on the grounds that if it 
were upheld, many similar claims could also be made, and 
the public finances would be ruined. 
10. See the eight conditions given by Fuller 1964, and 
identified (rather strangely) as the 'morality' implicit in 
law. 
11. See Dworkin 1978 and 1986, and Scruton 1984, ch. 3, 
and 1987, in which I discuss Dworkin's views at greater 
length. 
12. I refer to Wittgenstein's celebrated arguments con-
cerning 'following a rule' in Wittgenstein 1953, part l, and 
Wittgenstein 1954. 
13. See Hayek 1973, ch. 4. 
14. Rawls 1971. 
15. 0. von Gierke, Deutsche Genossenscha/tsrecht (a frag-
ment of this work has been translated and introduced by 
Maitland 1900). See also Maitland's 'Trust and Corpora-
tion' in Fisher ed. l 911, vol. 3. 
16. The Roman Law doctrine is much more complicated 
than it is often represented to be. See Duff 1938, in 
which it is argued that Roman Law precisely does not 
make the philosophical distinction often attributed to it, 
between person and human being. 
17. On the difficulties presented by this idea see Maitland, 
'The Corporation Sole', in Fisher, op. cit. 
18. For a sketch of the political significance of this, see 
Scruton 1984, ch. 8, 'The Autonomous Institution'. 
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19. Hegel 1942; Tocqueville 1835. 
20. Such immunities, granted to trade unions by the Brit-
ish Parliament in 1906, have led to considerable doubt as 
to the nature and extent of trade union liabilities. It 
seems, nevertheless, that a trade union, though an 'unin-
corporated association', may be sued at common law in its 
own name: Bonson v. Musicians' Union (1956) A.C.104. On 
the issue of the legal identity of the trade union. see the 
excellent discussion in Ross M. Martin 1958. 
21. This is made clear by Act 36 of 26 February 1964 -
•concerning the Organisations and Election of the Judi-
ciary' - as amended by Act 29 of 27 February 1968, Act 
17 5 of 20 December 1968, Act 156 of 17 December 1969, 
and Act 29 of 5 April 1978, section 24 of which ('the 
basic duties of judges') includes the provision that judges 
shall interpret statutes and other legal regulations 'in the 
interest of the working people' - this interest being itself 
determined in practice by Party decree. Such legal records 
as there are, therefore, can have no binding authority, 
since no merely legal process can determine what is 
meant, from day to day, by 'the interests of the working 
people'. See also Dani~ 1980, p. 165: 'Judicial independence 
does not mean that a judge may arbitrarily assert his 
own, subjective opinion. It is an independence which at 
the same time involves the judge's dependence on the 
socialist legal system which expresses the will of the rul-
ing working class.' In other words the law is not deter-
mined by judicial reasoning, but by an extralegal, meta-
physical entity - •the will of the ruling working class' -
whose concrete embodiment in the world of mortals is all 
too familiar under another name. 
22. Hegel 1942. para. 224. 
23. Ibid., para. 211, note. 
24. This view approximates to that advanced by Hart 
1955. 
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